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1 Introduction 
 
Innovative firms in developing countries have the odds stacked against them in more than one way. 
They must contend with the objective difficulties of all sorts of capital shortages and deficient 
infrastructures. Highly-trained scientists, well-endowed labs, seed funding, and institutions that test 
and certify prototypes and protect the resulting intellectual property are few and far between in the 
South. They must also come to terms with global value chains in which for different reasons both 
multinational corporations and smaller, knowledge-intensive firms typically keep R&D close to 
home. And finally, they are up against the broad brush of academic thought on industrial 
development which essentially holds that because of the technology gap between developed and 
developing countries, innovation proper can only really happen in the North. Thus if innovative 
firms appear on the radar screen at all, they are likely to register but an errant blip, the exception to 
the rule, that do not warrant systematic analysis. 
 
 This paper analyses the absorptive capacities of automotive component suppliers in South 
Africa. It shows that some firms design and manufacture innovative products, while others upgrade 
their technological capability or merely strive to attain execution competence. It suggests that the 
reason for the differential performance lies in the strategic use of advanced technical skills and the 
kind of learning about frontier technology engendered by R&D. It further discusses the ways in 
which foreign-owned technology is internalised more or less easily depending on whether or not it 
is controlled by multinational firms or by passive investors. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
absorptive capacities in developing countries. Section 3 discusses innovation and the technology 
frontier in the automotive industry, and Section 4 briefly outlines why this is relevant to firms in 
South Africa. Section 5 presents data and methodology. Section 6 discusses the findings. Section 7 
concludes with suggestions for further research. 
 
2 Absorptive capacities in advanced developing countries 
 
Whatever the outcome of the technological activities of firms, it is uncontroversial that their 
endeavours are based on learning. Learning, in turn, implies the ability to identify relevant 
knowledge from the environment, to get on top of its codifications or unwritten secrets, and to make 
use of its commercial potential. Relevant knowledge may exist as process or product innovations or 
in pre-commercial form, for example when basic research serves as a basis for applied R&D. The 
key tenet of this kind of learning, which has entered the vocabulary as absorptive capacity, is that it 
reflects a purposeful search – doing things differently, or generating and managing technical change 
– as opposed to mere learning-by-doing aimed exclusively at doing things right, or execution 
competence to produce industrial goods at given levels of efficiency and input combinations. 
Learning relies on prior knowledge which depending on industry characteristics may be very costly 
to accumulate. R&D promotes learning in that its very practice contributes to making informed, 
strategic choices about which external knowledge to select, how to evaluate and assimilate it, and in 
what ways to exploit it. Hence R&D is only partially about generating new information (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1989). 
 
Absorptive capacity is also a byproduct of manufacturing operations insofar as they help 
firms recognize and make use of new information relevant to a product market, and it feeds off the 
skills created through advanced technical training (ATS). Strategically, firms with highly developed 
absorptive capacities are more likely to appreciate emerging technological opportunities, while 
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underdeveloped absorptive capacities risk landing a firm in situations of lockout (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990). 
 
 Since firms draw on individually specific resources and competences, they also differ in the 
way they acquire, assimilate, transform, and exploit knowledge. For instance, some firms may 
benefit from long and deep experience that allows them judiciously to pick the most relevant 
knowledge. Others may be particularly proficient in comprehending idiosyncratic methodologies of 
an external technology, while engineers in yet others may have a knack for adapting and 
internalizing that same technology and aligning it with the strategic orientation of their 
organization. Finally, a last group of firms may be relatively slow in the first three aspects but very 
disciplined and ultimately fastest in bringing the resulting product to market. For each individual 
firm it is important to achieve a balance between its potential absorptive capacity derived from 
knowledge acquisition and assimilation on the one hand, and its realized capacity resulting from 
knowledge transformation and exploitation on the other. Of course, a firm could be very “smart” in 
terms of figuring out exceedingly complex problems and at the same time relatively inept at 
translating those insights into feasible product strategies (Zahra and George 2002). 
 
 The absorptive capacities of individual firms exist in the context of an institutional milieu 
that influences how easy and attractive it is for them to acquire and internalize knowledge. Since 
firms interact with one another and with their institutional environment it is then possible to 
conceive of learning as a higher-level – regional or national – activity as well. Much like individual 
firms, countries follow more or less successful technological trajectories partly because the 
collective learning abilities they represent allow them to confront new information, digest technical 
change, and develop new knowledge. However, the rich literature on firm-level absorptive 
capacities is not yet reflected in equally consolidated analyses of national absorptive capacity. 
Authors use different terms when referring to similar ideas about the aggregation of firm-level 
capacities to the national level within some form of systematic knowledge infrastructure. Examples 
include accumulated technological competence (Bell and Pavitt 1993), technological capability 
(Lall 1993, Pack and Saggi 1997), local capability (Blomström and Kokko 1998), knowledge 
systems (Bell and Albu 1999), technology systems (Lall and Pietrobelli 2002), and so forth. For a 
systematic appraisal and critique of the literature, see Narula (2003). 
 
 In the absence of a generally agreed notion of national absorptive capacity aggregated 
upwards from firm-level competences, many analyses of the direction, depth, and success of 
technological activity make use of the concept of national innovation system (NIS; Edquist 1997, 
Freeman 1995, Nelson 1993; see also Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2002)). NIS works roughly 
the other way round. It first specifies the institutional characteristics of country-level technological 
efforts, and then explains firm activities within them. As the name suggests, its heuristic focus is on 
innovation understood as a genuinely new commercialized product or process. Embedded in 
historical accounts with an appreciation for the role of social capital, analyses in this tradition 
consequently pay much attention to science and technology (S&T) institutions, resources committed 
to R&D, and patentable outputs. This makes it problematic to apply this framework to developing 
countries where technical change certainly takes place but where technological activity is not 
principally about pushing out the technology frontier, and where conventional S&T and R&D 
indicators are hard to come by and for a variety of reasons may not mean that much in any event 
(cf. Freeman 1994). 
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 Yet to reconceptualise NIS as a national system of technical change (NSTC; Viotti 2002) 
merely swaps around two problems. Because of its preoccupation with cutting-edge, state-of-the-art 
endeavours, NIS does not really understand anything but frontier activities. And because of a 
presupposition that innovation proper can never happen in developing countries, NSTC is unable to 
account for the graduation of successful catch-up countries – or firms or sectors within them – to 
advanced levels of industrialization. For example, in the late 1990s the IMF reclassified Israel, 
Singapore, and Taiwan as developed countries. But this is merely a statistical convention. In reality, 
the graduation from developing-country status is obviously not a discrete event but a long and 
complicated process, articulated in a multitude of ways and, incidentally, subject to reversals. In 
other words, while NIS misses the wood for the tree, NSTC doesn’t see the trees for the wood. 
Although the last word is clearly not yet said in this regard, emerging solutions to this problem may 
lie in attempts to link the absorptive capacities of firms with national performance in stage-based 
models of development that range from the pre-catching up to the frontier-sharing phase and are 
thus agnostic with respect to how far developing countries can catch up (Criscuolo and Narula 
2002, Narula and Dunning 2000). The concept of national absorptive capacity has the advantage 
that it is a priori non-committal about who, and in what part of the world, innovates while offering 
however tentative conjectures about how a country moves from a lower to a higher level of 
technological activity. 
 
 By definition, the advanced knowledge that developing-country firms acquire is often 
foreign. Trade, FDI, and arm’s-length projects such as license contracts are all important channels 
of technology. A couple of observations are in order. First, external knowledge and domestic 
absorptive capacity must match to generate long-run benefits. It takes two to tango; more advanced 
knowledge is wasted in the absence of an increased rate of human capital formation (e.g. Keller 
1996; see Liu and White (1997) for an analysis of how Chinese firms gained leverage by investing 
in both technology imports and R&D personnel). Second, although MNCs and host-country firms 
have in some ways a diametrically opposed interest – namely to internalize the full value of 
productivity or efficiency benefits resulting from superior technology on the one hand, and realizing 
spillover benefits from the entry or presence of MNCs on the other – the imitation of FDI by local 
firms need not be adversarial. More precisely, if for cost reasons MNCs want to use advanced 
technologies in developing countries, then it is in their interest that domestic R&D activities expand 
the local technology frontier, providing a more fertile ground for their competitive assets (Glass and 
Saggi 1998). 
 
Third, equity ownership does not in all instances equal control over technology. Of course, 
with internalized transfer modes control over the technology ultimately rests with the foreign firm. 
But (passive) foreign investors other than MNCs may take an equity stake without interfering with 
local management. Along with the more or less tacit character of the technology in question, this is 
likely to have implications for how much leeway local firms have to invest in their absorptive 
capacities. And fourth, globalization entails that developing-country firms that produce for global 
supply chains aimed at world markets increasingly turn out products to the same quality 
specifications as their competitors in advanced economies. Although this does not automatically 
imply a total homologation of processes, it clearly exerts pressure to adopt more and more advanced 
technologies, regardless of the comparative advantage of the production site in question. This 
underlines the importance of international best practices and the limits to national idiosyncrasies in 
process technology. 
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3 New knowledge in automotive component manufacturing 
 
This section does four things. It first refers to the different incentives firms have across sectors with 
respect to what knowledge they internalize and how they exploit it. Then it describes ongoing 
technical change in car manufacturing, including innovations at the technology frontier. It further 
discusses the management of innovation in global supply chains. Finally, it draws out the 
implications of sector characteristics for absorptive capacities of automotive component 
manufacturers in developing countries. 
 
The nature of technical change differs from sector to sector. Firms in production and scale 
intensive sectors such as vehicle assembly tend to concentrate on process innovation. Automotive 
production is extremely complex and the whole value chain is only as reliable as its weakest link. 
Operating conditions therefore put a premium on production engineering and process engineering in 
order to minimize bottlenecks and to squeeze productivity increases out of improved equipment. By 
contrast, in science-based sectors such as electronic engineering, firms devote most of their 
innovative resources to product innovation (Pavitt 1984). This means that firms involved in 
electronic automotive components are likely to search for different kinds of new knowledge 
compared to manufacturers of steel panels. It does not mean that they are more innovative, only that 
the nature of innovation in their sector is different. Differences across sectors are relevant to 
learning as well. The sector-specific characteristics of technological and scientific knowledge 
determine the ease with which firms learn. The larger the quantity and the higher degree of 
difficulty of knowledge to assimilate, the more incentives exist to learn and, thus, to invest in R&D 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1989). 
 
 Car manufacturers are caught between a rock and a hard place. Pressure comes from the 
market and from regulators. Consumers demand more features and performance options while also 
insisting on higher fuel efficiency and longer service intervals. Regulators insist on more stringent 
environmental rules. In Europe, the latter include the End of Life Vehicle Directive with its 
mandatory recycling of old vehicles by the manufacturer, and Euro-IV legislation that requires car 
makers to halve emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxide and particulates by 
2005. Since many car makers are not very profitable and competition is intense, producing more 
variety with greater content at lower cost and environmental impact presents difficult challenges. In 
the short to medium term, projects include hybrids – cars that combine a conventional engine with 
an electric motor; 42V electrical systems to support the energy demand of extra applications; 
complex spark-ignition engines with electronically controlled valves, a variable compression ratio, 
cylinder deactivation, and an integral starter-generator; electronically shifted manual gearboxes and 
one-speed continuously variable transmissions; and the replacement of steel through aluminium, 
magnesium, and plastics for body and structure (Feast 2002, Jodoin 2001, Truett 2002, Vasilash 
2003). 
 
 Much more radical change is in the pipeline for the medium term. Concept cars such as 
GM’s “AUTOnomy” or Bertone/SKF’s “Fib” combine fuel cell propulsion and drive-by-wire 
systems, thus doing away with internal combustion engines, drive train, transmission, and 
mechanical or hydraulic linkages or axles (Chiappero and Bak 2002, Teresko 2003). A less radical 
vision sees hydrogen fuel cells merely replace the internal combustion engine in what will 
otherwise remain a conventional car. Whichever vision prevails, some incarnation of fuel cell cars 
is expected to be commercially available as early as 2008 and no later than 2015 (Cato 2003), 
 4
demanding both exploratory and radical learning – and hence more R&D effort – through the 
automotive supply chain. 
 
 Car makers responded to the cost pressures associated with making better automobiles at 
essentially constant prices by outsourcing part of the innovation behind improved vehicle designs. 
Like firms in many other sectors they also had to come to terms with an increase in the number of 
highly mobile knowledge workers and with private venture capital willing to bet on risky ideas. All 
of this made it more difficult to retain control of proprietary knowledge. Car makers began to adopt 
the open innovation model whereby they commercialized external as well as internal ideas 
(Chesbrough 2003). This does not mean that they discontinued or reduced internal R&D. On the 
contrary, as discussed in Section 2, internal R&D is a precondition for recognizing and selecting 
external knowledge (Howell and Hsu 2002; see Söderquist, Chanaron, and Birchall (2001) for an 
analysis of the learning challenges engendered by the transfer of design activities to OEM 
suppliers). Indeed in electronics, with 80-90% the most important area of automotive innovation by 
value, suppliers easily spend twice as much on R&D as the automotive industry average of about 
four per cent of turnover (Brown 2003). 
 
 World car designs – meaning the worldwide availability of locally adapted versions of 
essentially the same vehicle – and the partial devolution of design responsibilities to .5- and 1st-tier 
suppliers based on the principles of follow-source (the same manufacturer supplies parts in different 
locations) and follow-design (several countries share the same component design) provoked much 
speculation regarding the desirability of car industry investments in developing countries. The 
alleged problem is that the automotive value chain logic will always prioritise R&D in home 
countries, thus debasing local engineering skills and technological depth in developing countries 
more generally. But while this may have been true for the initial phase of investments in developing 
countries and transition economies undertaken in the 1990s aimed at world markets, the argument 
that it will of necessity always do so is not convincing (see Lorentzen and Barnes (forthcoming) and 
Lorentzen, Møllgaard, and Rojec (2003) for a fuller statement and a rebuttal of the argument). 
 
 Anecdotal evidence to illustrate this is easy to come by. For example, while it is true that 
only very few Brazilian car component suppliers own technology independently of their overseas 
principals, this does not stop them – and may indeed be a major incentive – from spending a higher 
share of their income on R&D (6 per cent) than MNC subsidiaries in Brazil (5 per cent) and, more 
importantly, than the automotive sector on average worldwide (4 per cent) (Zilbovicius, Marx, and 
Salerno 2002). This may suggest that their R&D expenditure is inefficient or, worse, redundant. 
More plausibly, however, these firms are investing in their ability to keep up with technological 
advances pioneered elsewhere (see also Rachid 2001). 
 
 Insights from Spain, until not so long firmly on the periphery of the European car 
manufacturing system, indicate that what hinders the extension of design activities in 2nd- and 3rd-
tier suppliers is not technological capability per se but rather issues of firm size, international 
presence, specialization, attitude, and reputation (González-Benito 2001). Based on this analysis 
local firms in developing countries must, loosely put, simply find a partner, think big, and make 
friends in order to muscle into more challenging positions in global supply chains. 
 
 Finally, the car assemblers do not control everything that happens in the car industry. For 
example, the impending revision of the regulations of new car distribution in the EU involve a 
novel – and much broader – definition of what constitutes original spare parts sold under a 
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carmaker’s brand name, namely all parts that match the carmaker’s specification regardless of 
where in the world and by whom they are produced. This opens the aftermarket and eventually 
perhaps also direct OEM supply to capable, independent component suppliers (Craemer-Kühn, 
Junghans, and Krönig 2004). All these issues are relevant to the automotive supplier industry in 
South Africa. 
 
4 South Africa’s automotive industry 
 
All major OEMs are present in South Africa where they manufacture 13 brands in seven plants. In 
2003 the country produced some 401,000 light vehicles, representing a mere 0.7 per cent of global 
vehicle production. But the automotive industry is the third largest sector in the economy, after 
mining and financial services, and in 2002 contributed 29 per cent to manufacturing output and 6.3 
per cent to GDP. Since 1995, when government embarked on a strategy aimed at turning the 
formerly highly protected sector into a competitive global supplier, exports of CBU (completely 
built up) vehicles and components grew at a compound annual rate of 38 per cent. The share of 
automotive in total exports roughly tripled to 12.8 per cent. Easy availability of key raw materials, 
low energy costs, and the traditional flexibility to produce short runs allow for the occupation of 
niche markets, such as the right-hand drive BMW 3-series and the Mercedes C class. At the same 
time South Africa is also the most important supplier of catalytic converters to the EU, and the 
second most important to the US, holding 12 per cent of the world market. 
 
The industry’s performance under a radically liberalized trade regime is generally 
considered a success. Yet with competition looming from China and India, no let-up in the squeeze 
on margins worldwide, and a reduction in local value added in newer, more sophisticated models – 
which is only partly due to the Rand appreciation – imply that South African component 
manufacturers will have to upgrade to defend their position in the global value chain. According to 
the Department of Trade and Industry, “[i]nvestments in new technology for the component 
manufacturers will be a key driver in achieving the global objectives of the South African 
automotive industry” (DTI 2003, 38). This ties in with the National Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology Strategy (AMTS), promoted by the government, whose objectives include the 
reduction of the country’s dependence on imported technologies and the strengthening of local 
innovation (CSIR 2003, 33). The Automotive Industry Development Council (AIDC), a semi-
public service provider, projects the future of the industry in world model industrialization and 
concept engineering and design (www.aidc.co.za). This is a long way from the CKD (completely 
knocked down) production of the early days, quite apart from being an ambitious answer to the 
strategic challenges facing the industry. In sum, new knowledge is key to maintain the export 
success of South Africa’s automotive component industry. 
 
5 Data and methodology 
 
The analysis is based on 25 case studies of South African automotive component suppliers from 
two of the country’s three major car production locations. Two assemblers corroborated the claims 
made by the component suppliers. The case firms represent four per cent of the entire industry in 
number and account for 6-7 per cent of its turnover. The firms span the entire range of possible 
ownership constellations. 15 are domestically owned (13 privately and 2 by a large holding 
company), 5 are formerly domestic companies owned by international investors (of which 4 are 
largely passive), and 5 are foreign-owned subsidiaries of European or North American MNCs none 
of which were greenfield investments. Sales include the aftermarket (10), assemblers (13), and 1st-
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tier suppliers (15) on both the local and the global market. Their export-to-sales ratio in 2002 was 0-
80 per cent. They are either 1st- or 2nd-tier suppliers, or both. In terms of size, the firms ranged from 
30 to 1000 employees and ZAR5 to ZAR1, 500 million turnover. The product portfolio includes 
relatively simple parts such as chassis elements, components such as alarm devices or lighting as 
well as complete systems for fuel and exhaust management and air conditioning. 
 
Senior managers in the firms – in most cases the managing director or the CEO – agreed to 
an in-depth discussion with the author. They received a questionnaire as a basis for a semi-
structured interview (see Appendix 1) prior to the meeting, and subsequently a written protocol for 
review. All interviewees were given a chance to review and comment upon the paper. Due to the in 
part highly confidential nature of the data, firm identities could not be revealed. The interview 
explored questions derived from the theoretical discussion in Section 2 and thus focused on the 
conditions under which learning is promoted by management, what kind of consequences it has for 
technological activities, and whether it supports technological upgrading and innovation. 
 
 Only two firms spent close to (3-4 per cent of turnover) or just above (5 per cent) the 
international average (4 per cent) for the automotive industry on R&D. Many firms reported no 
R&D expenditure at all. However, this information was not always to be taken at face value. Some 
firms really did not commit any resources to design-related activities or R&D proper. But the 
investigation revealed that others, especially smaller firms, simply did not account for human 
capital committed to activities that in larger organisations would be billed to the R&D budget. In 
several cases the absence of a dedicated development department meant that staff primarily 
assigned to production engineering and only partially responsible for activities to do with upgrading 
or innovation did not register with the latter activities at all even if they led to potentially patentable 
process innovations. This confirmed doubts referred to above concerning the appropriateness of 
conventional R&D indicators for assessing technological activities in developing countries 
(Freeman 1994, Viotti 2002). Hence while the analysis made unconditional use of reported positive 
R&D figures – and thus differentiated between high and low spenders – it only made qualified use 
of reported zero expenditure. 
 
 By contrast, the qualitative information about advanced technical skills (ATS) and the 
nature of technical agreements (TA) with foreign technology partners was reliable and provided a 
rich picture of the circumstances under which learning did or did not take place. Hence it was easy 
to probe how, and what for, managers utilised ATS, and in what way TAs related to know-how, 
know-why or – as the case might be – know-anything. In addition, information about the sub-sector 
specific technology frontier (see Appendix Table 1) made it possible to gauge the technological gap 
between each of the case firms and the leading firms and industrial research laboratories in the 
world in a particular product or process. In the absence of a reliable indicator of R&D spending, 
absorptive capacity is taken to be a function of the proximity of individual firms to the technology 
frontier and the use of ATS. 
 
The different articulations of absorptive capacity thus constructed are captured in Figure 1. 
Close proximity need not – though may well – indicate that a firm owns an innovation but merely 
that it understands it as a result of learning resulting partly from R&D activities. It further means 
that it can fully replicate it or design a competitive product not long after the technology leader. 
Firms at medium proximity to the technology frontier understand the lead technology enough to 
adapt it or reengineer it with a considerable lag. Their main challenge is to marshal the resources 
necessary for the upgrading of their technological capabilities, aligning their process competence 
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with the production requirements of advanced technology. Firms distant to the frontier understand 
frontier technology at most minimally. They are unlikely to have the capacity to handle it though 
they may be able to assemble simplified black-box kits that embody frontier technology. Their main 
challenge is to ensure that their production capacity is at a level where it can efficiently handle 
given input combinations. 
 
Figure 1. – Operationalisation of absorptive capacities 
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 The technological complexity and the rate of technical change of a subsector obviously 
condition the relative ease with which firms can attain proximity to the technology frontier. Thus 
this framework allows comparisons of like with like – for example, between the technological depth 
of exhaust manufacturers – but not, say, of producers of tapes for seat seams as opposed to 
manufacturers of HVAC systems. 
 
Changes in the quantity or quality of process or product engineering skills influence the 
development of absorptive capacities. At one extreme, firms in close proximity to the frontier that 
strengthen their R&D commitment may acquire the ability to push the frontier further. By contrast, 
firms with low absorptive capacity and outdated machinery, depreciating labour and management 
skills, or organisational systems unable to cope with the requirements of lean production, are likely 
to exit the supply chain. Firms that successfully upgrade their production capacity may acquire 
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technological capability and perhaps even innovative competence. Their trajectory would move 
from the bottom right of Figure 1 through the centre upward. Likewise, firms with decreasing ATS 
may regress from the top left through the centre downward. 
 
6 Findings 
 
The case firms can be categorised into four groups, namely innovators, followers, mandate 
executers, and cliff hangers. Key differences between these categories lie in the use made of ATS, 
the nature of technical agreements, forms of ownership and, with the caveat noted above, R&D 
spending. 
 
Six firms are innovators (see Table 1). By definition they have high absorptive capacities. 
These firms maintained or increased considerable stocks of ATS dedicated to some form of design 
work which is partially reflected in significant R&D spending. One of them holds multiple 
international product patents and licenses its technology to major OEMs. Another participated in a 
government-sponsored research consortium (but reported zero R&D spending) that led to a patented 
process innovation. Three firms have technical agreements (TA) but in only one of these is the 
South African firm the junior partner. In one case the TA’s main purpose is to reassure an OEM 
customer of a link-up with a preferred supplier but is effectively devoid of content. In another case, 
the technological relationship between the local firm and its foreign owner is mutual in that the two 
sides share their respective competences of design and testing on the one hand and production 
engineering and machining on the other. No firm is a MNC subsidiary. The foreign-owned firms do 
not have less leeway than their domestic competitors in deciding whether and how to commit R&D 
and ATS strategically to design activities. 
 
All innovator firms find themselves in close proximity to the technology frontier, at least 
with part of their operation. Thanks to a strong strategic commitment to ATS, this appears unlikely 
to change in the medium term. Note however that this is not a guarantee to live happily ever 
thereafter. For example, the manufacturer of automotive leathers might get caught unawares by a 
radical product substitution away from natural hides. Also, the die caster is unlikely to have the 
financial depth required for the introduction of advanced rapid prototyping and rapid tooling 
techniques that directly convert three-dimensional CAD data into physical prototype and 
manufacturing. These techniques promise to reduce lead time and the cost of industrial tooling. This 
merely underlines that the maintenance of high absorptive capacity at least in some areas requires, 
next to a high level of ATS, considerable capital resources. 
 
 Eight firms are followers with medium levels of absorptive capacities (see Table 2). They 
have in common with the innovators that they maintained or increased their stock of ATS. 
However, their technological efforts are broadly directed at optimising process solutions. This 
ranges from improving their own production technology to designing less capital-intensive 
processes more amenable to the resource constraints in developing countries or even superior 
processes for customers in advanced economies. One firm hopes to leverage production competence 
into incremental design mandates, and another already has a partial design remit for a niche market. 
Two formerly domestically-owned firms had to discontinue process design and product R&D 
activities subsequent to the acquisition by foreign investors. The main reasons included the 
availability of superior technology through the parent and the need to centralise R&D in the 
multinational group. The discontinuation of these activities had some de-skilling effects yet it would 
not be fair to characterise the technological trajectory of either firm as stagnant or decreasing. That 
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is because they use their accumulated experience to manage and generate technical change which is 
the common element across these follower firms.  With one exception and regardless of ownership, 
these firms have TAs. They include licenses and intra-MNC technology transfer. This represents of 
course part of the external knowledge that the local firms both acquire and internalise. Most firms 
reported some R&D spending which is individually both lower and higher than that of innovator 
firms. The latter, in turn, simply suggests that some followers may invest more in their learning than 
some innovators in their innovation competence. Innovators, in other words, battle with diminishing 
returns. 
 
Seven firms are mandate executers (see Table 3). They dispose of minimal stocks of ATS 
which they use to maintain or attain a quality of production capacity acceptable to OEM customers 
in the automotive value chain. Compared to innovators and followers, a larger share of the mandate 
executers’ output is destined for local OEM supply and the aftermarket. Vehicles assembled 
exclusively for the domestic market belong to a different technological generation than those sold 
on the world market. Hence, the demands on parts and components are less exacting, too. The same 
applies to aftermarket accessories such as bull bars that are clearly easier to engineer than, say, 
replacement HVAC systems. Most of these firms are domestically owned and do not have technical 
agreements. Reported R&D spending is at best negligible which in the context of the interviews 
appears to reflect reality accurately. In the presence of tight resource constraints and all the other 
negative factors that bedevil the attempts at technological upgrading by developing-country firms, 
much appears to hinge on sheer entrepreneurial drive. The seat frame manufacturer, for example, 
successfully bid on an OEM contract without ever having manufactured a single such item and, 
more importantly, without disappointing its client upon winning the bid. Overall, the combination 
of a relatively low level of ATS or none at all, and no or little investment in learning suggests that 
these firms have difficulty in acquiring and internalising external information, especially if it is not 
available on the market. Hence, their absorptive capacities are low. These firms are likely to 
become marginal players unless they grow ATS or exploit TAs so as to prevent lock-in and ensure 
that, at a minimum, their distance to the technology frontier does not increase. 
 
Four firms are cliff hangers. Note that the term does not imply that they produce low-quality 
components. In fact, the manufacturer of interior parts belongs to a MNC that produces technology 
at the forefront of automotive interior design. But becoming part of a multinational group is clearly 
no guarantee against a reduction in the level of absorptive capacity. In this particular case, were the 
parent ever to walk away from the subsidiary, technologically it would pretty much leave an empty 
shell. Cliff hangers, thus, are firms that do not necessarily understand the technology they are 
working with, let alone that at the frontier. None of these firms have increased their ATS; indeed 
many do not use them for anything to do with learning. Instead, the human capital that embodies 
these skills supervises production or runs the commercial aspects of the business. In the context of 
diminishing ATS, the TAs held by two firms are not a case of know-why and at most partly an aid 
to know-how. It thus makes sense that these firms report no or negligible R&D spending. Their 
absorptive capacities are quite clearly rather low. 
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Table 1. – Absorptive capacities of case firms: innovators 
  
Product/ 
ownership 
Firm mandate Most advanced technical 
skills/ 
type of learning 
Technical agreements Knowledge characteristics at 
technology frontier 
R&D 
spending/ 
turnover 
Proximity to technology 
frontier 
       
Automotive leathers/ 
Foreign (formerly 
domestically owned) 
2nd tier. Follow-design 
supplier to world 
market with occasional 
design input 
7 engineers/ 
purposeful search for new 
qualities and process savings in 
dedicated R&D facility 
 
Co-development of new 
designs with input 
suppliers and 
downstream users 
Seat filling innovations; leather 
material substitutes 
2-3% Close, increasing: design and 
process; 
Far, stable: leather substitution 
Alarms, immobilizers/ 
Domestic 
1st- and 2nd-tier. Mainly 
own design for 
aftermarket but also for 
domestic OEM supply 
7 senior engineers, 1 
draughtsman, 10 technicians/ 
purposeful search in dedicated 
design team 
 
None Interconnectivity of vehicle 
security systems with mobile 
phones and internet 
5% Close, stable: local mgmt put a 
premium on in-house design 
Fuel tanks and systems/ 
Domestic 
1st-tier. Primarily OEM 
supply for local market 
based on own process 
technology 
3 engineers plus 2 engineering 
student interns/ 
purposeful search for new 
process and product to 
guarantee tank impermeability 
in dedicated design unit 
 
Technical input from 
raw-material suppliers, 
alliances with and 
licenses from preferred 
OEM suppliers 
Blow-formed complete vapour 
recovery tanks 
1.2% Close, stable: local mgmt 
research next-generation tank 
technology to comply with new 
0-emission standards in view of 
gaining global niche mandates 
Catalytic converters/ 
Foreign (formerly 
domestically owned) 
Primarily global 
aftermarket for 
replacement and 
retrofitting 
2 engineers, 1 technician/ 
purposeful search for optimal 
process lay-out for simplified 
state-of-the-art cats 
 
JV with preferred OEM 
supplier, technology 
from parent and to OEM 
and 1st-tier supplier; 
international patent 
holder 
Advanced simulation software, 
lighter and more complex (incl. air 
intake) exhaust system structure 
and design; lower emission product 
technology 
3-4% Close, stable: local mgmt 
exploits design and testing 
relationship with overseas 
parent 
Tyres/ 
Domestic 
Primarily aftermarket 8 engineers/ 
purposeful search for optimal 
properties of performance tyres 
 
License from competitor New tyre build processes and 
electronic “intelligent” tyre systems 
1-2% Close, stable: high-end 
performance tyres 
Medium, decreasing: intelligent 
tyres and new processes 
Aluminium squeeze 
castings/ 
Domestic 
1st- and 2nd-tier. 
Aftermarket and 
follow-design world 
market 
3 engineers/ 
search for new materials and 
processes 
Joint research with 
UKZN and CSIR on 
new process technology 
Substitute materials and techniques 
with superior performance 
characteristics, rapid prototyping 
(RP) and tooling (RT) technology 
 
0% Close, stable: substitution of 
aluminium through magnesium; 
Medium, stable: everything else 
      
 
Note: UKZN = University of KwaZulu-Natal; CSIR = Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. For information on technology frontier, see Appendix Table 1. 
Source: Case firms 
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7 Conclusions 
 
This analysis has produced three insights. First, firms in an advanced developing country sustaining 
an investment in their own learning travel on a different technological trajectory from those that do 
not. A higher level of absorptive capacity means that they partially or fully understand state-of-the-
art technology, in some cases all the way to the technology frontier. Understanding technology is 
more important for catching-up than producing it. This is because producers of world-class parts or 
components that are not cognizant of the technology these products are based on are in principle 
substitutable through more cost-competitive plants elsewhere. By contrast, firms with the ability to 
search for and then internalise and transform technical solutions carry more weight in international 
supply chains. Firms with medium levels of absorptive capacity that want to upgrade their 
technological activity focus on process optimisation. This reflects their considerable accumulated 
knowledge that allows them to design process solutions even though they are part of a supply chain 
that often puts a premium not just on follow-design but also on follow-process. Hence, an 
improving technological capability not only reduces the distance to the technology frontier in terms 
of how to manage technical change, but also opens up opportunities for generating it. 
 
 Firms with depreciating or underutilised advanced technical skills that do not invest in their 
learning can hang on to their remits so long as technical change in their particular portfolio is slow 
and they are thus not much in need of learning. The occupation of downmarket niches – in the form 
of old-generation vehicles and the aftermarket demand they generate – is also a medium-term 
survival strategy. But downmarket niches are an exception to the trend of world cars and not 
suitable for anything but a defensive strategy. What is clear is that no amount of technology transfer 
will help firms stay competitive whose absorptive capacities are low because of decreasing ATS. 
Technology without learning is like a fish out of water and not a viable long-term proposition. 
 
 Second, the relationship between the absorptive capacity of developing-country firms and 
foreign technology is not straightforward. At issue is not product quality per se because anything 
other than high quality is not really viable in global automotive supply. Also, car assembly as such 
says little about the technological sophistication of a country and virtually nothing about its catch-
up potential. The question is if the conditions of access to foreign technology allow for and enable 
further learning or not, and if the attendant opportunities are exploited. The case firms showed that 
multinational control over domestic firms – and, thus, repositories of existing national technological 
expertise – may help local firms upgrade or assign them dramatically regressive remits. See, for 
example, the difference between the two manufacturers of interior parts in Tables 2 and 4, 
respectively. This presents a stark alternative and goes to the heart of industrial development. 
 
 Liberal investment regimes preclude distinguishing between “good” and “bad” foreign 
investors, quite apart from the question of the technical feasibility of such an exercise. But the case 
firms also showed that all instances of “good” foreign ownership were characterised by a strong 
commitment to enhancing learning through ATS and investments in R&D on the part of local 
management. This is no guarantee for building sustainable local technological capabilities. But 
perhaps it is the next best thing (and also the reason for It’s R&D, stupid!). Therefore if the 
capacities created by the learning environment in an advanced developing country – or in this case 
more specifically the South African S&T and higher education infrastructure – lie below the 
requisites of using available foreign technology, then FDI holds much less promise for industrial 
upgrading. In other words, the potential benefits of foreign knowledge are largely wasted in a host 
country with mainly cliff-hanger firms. The graduation from mandate executers to followers is 
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likely to rely on the availability of TAs, but the ultimate outcome of this catching up may well be to 
diminish the importance of FDI relative to other forms of external knowledge. In policy terms, this 
should put the knowledge infrastructure more prominently on the map. 
 
Third, compared to the opportunities and pitfalls of FDI our understanding of national 
absorptive capacities in (advanced) developing countries is rather poor and warrants more attention. 
The significance and reliability of R&D indicators is a case in point. Without reliable indicators, 
learning at firm level is difficult to assess. And unless the micro determinants of absorptive 
capacities become clearer, empirical aggregation to higher-level units is fraught with problems. 
This asks for more case studies to qualify more representative but perhaps less solid survey or panel 
data (see Zahra and George (2002, 193-9) for a series of testable propositions). At the same time, 
the institutional characteristics of learning at national level should be addressed because they 
influence – through skill provision, basic and applied research and testing institutes, the intellectual 
property regime, and so forth – how firms go about their technological activities. 
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Table 2. – Absorptive capacities of case firms: followers 
  
Product/ 
ownership 
Firm mandate Most advanced technical skills/ 
type of learning 
Technical agreements Knowledge characteristics at 
technology frontier 
R&D 
spending/ 
turnover 
Proximity to technology 
frontier 
       
Interior parts and 
accessories/ 
Foreign (formerly 
domestically 
owned) 
1st-tier. Strictly follow-
design for world market 
and OEM supply for 
domestic market 
1 engineer, 2 technical development 
managers/ 
purposeful search for best practices in 
production technology; own tooling 
discontinued 
Knowledge transfer 
from licensors and JV 
partners in process and 
product 
New materials, new moulding 
techniques, sophisticated systems 
architecture developed in advanced 
simulation programmes 
2.3%  
  
  
  
  
Medium, increasing: local
mgmt interact with senior 
technology partners to bolster 
technological capability for 
independent contracting 
 
HVAC/ 
MNC subsidiary 
(formerly 
domestically 
owned) 
1st-tier. Mostly follow-
design for world 
market; re-engineering 
for aftermarket; re-
tooling for model 
changes 
 
3 engineers + 3 technical support staff/ 
search for cost-effective solutions for 
aftermarket and in retooling; blue-sky 
R&D discontinued 
Knowledge transfer 
from parent company 
Energy, environmental, and lead 
time process innovations; 
differentiated A/C optimization for 
individual passengers 
2.9% Medium, stable: local mgmt 
have 6-8 years product cycle to 
understand frontier technology 
to re-engineer for aftermarket 
Leather seat covers/ 
Foreign (formerly 
domestically 
owned) 
2nd-tier. Mostly follow-
design for world market, 
limited own design for 
select national market 
 
1 leather technologist, 13 certified and 10 
trainee technicians in dedicated design 
unit/ 
mix of  learning-by-doing and search for 
process optimization 
 
Cooperation upstream 
with tanneries and co-
development 
downstream with seat 
manufacturer 
Seat filling innovations; leather 
material substitutes 
1.75% Medium, stable: local mgmt 
understand sewing process 
innovation; 
Far, stable: product substitution 
Door locks/ 
Domestic 
2nd-tier. Primarily 
follow-design for world 
markets, OEM supply 
and some own design 
for domestic market 
 
5 engineers + 2 technologists/ 
purposeful search for process (optimal 
toolings) and product upgrading (license 
improvement) 
Licenses from preferred 
OEM suppliers 
New low-cost bus communication 
subarchitectures; web-based 
telematics for door lock control 
2.6% Medium, increasing: local
mgmt try to match execution 
competence with design 
reputation and look for 
European equity partner  
Lighting systems/ 
Domestic (formerly 
MNC subsidiary)
1st-tier. Primarily OEM 
supply for domestic 
market, also aftermarket 
6 engineers, 8 technicians/ 
purposeful search, esp. in reengineering 
and process improvements; also design 
of simpler products in dedicated 
development unit 
Licenses with preferred 
OEM suppliers 
Advanced simulation software to 
obviate prototype building, new 
light sources, adaptive lighting 
systems 
2-3% Medium, increasing: local
mgmt do not have the volumes 
to justify capital investments to 
close the gap but are aggressive 
about process technology 
 
Catalytic converters/ 
MNC subsidiary 
(formerly 
domestically 
owned) 
1st-tier. Strictly follow-
design for world 
markets but process 
autonomy 
1 sr project engineer with 10 technical 
support staff and 10 engineering student 
interns/ 
purposeful search for cost-effective 
process technology 
Knowledge transfer 
from parent 
Advanced simulation software, 
lighter and more complex (incl. air 
intake) exhaust system structure 
and design; lower emission product 
technology 
 
0% Medium, increasing: local
mgmt optimize processes for 
parent’s technology 
Fastening systems/ 
Domestic 
Mostly follow-design 
for world markets, 
limited own design for 
domestic market 
1 design engineer plus 4-5 technical 
support staff in dedicated R&D 
department/ 
purposeful search for customized 
fastening solutions and prototype tooling 
 
 
 
Alliances with suppliers Advanced simulation software, new 
material development 
1.4% Medium, increasing: local
mgmt involved in numerous 
cooperative (non-automotive) 
R&D projects 
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Product/ 
ownership 
Firm mandate Most advanced technical skills/ 
type of learning 
Technical agreements Knowledge characteristics at 
technology frontier 
R&D 
spending/ 
turnover 
Proximity to technology 
frontier 
       
Painted plastic 
parts/ 
MNC subsidiary 
1st-tier. Mostly follow-
design for world market 
and OEM supply for 
domestic market 
 
5 engineers and 10 technical support 
staff in toolroom/ 
learning-by-doing and search for optimal 
tooling solutions 
 
None Dry paint and moulded-in-colour 
films with superior cost and 
environmental characteristics 
0%  
    
Medium, increasing: local
management has upgrading 
agenda esp. for internal tooling 
competence 
 
 
Note: For information on technology frontier, see Appendix Table 1. 
Source: Case firms 
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Table 3. – Absorptive capacities of case firms: mandate executers 
  
Product/ 
ownership 
Firm mandate Most advanced technical 
skills/ 
type of learning 
Technical 
agreements 
Knowledge characteristics at 
technology frontier 
R&D 
spending/ 
turnover 
Proximity to technology 
frontier 
      
       
 
HVAC/ 
Domestic (formerly 
MNC subsidiary) 
1st- and 2nd-tier. Primarily 
follow-design for world 
market plus  aftermarket 
61 engineers, 120 technicians, 
15 technologists/ 
learning-by-doing plus 
identification of aftermarket 
niches; innovation activities 
and in-house tooling 
discontinued 
 
Numerous licenses 
from preferred 
OEM suppliers; 
competition with 
licensors in 
overseas markets 
not allowed 
Energy, environmental, and lead time 
process innovations; differentiated 
A/C optimization for individual 
passengers 
 
 
0.5% Far, decreasing: local mgmt 
execute licenses without fully 
understanding their technology; 
deskilling 
Seat frames/ 
Domestic 
2nd- and 1st-tier. Primarily 
follow-design for world 
market and OEM supply for 
local market 
 
1 engineer/ 
learning-by-doing plus trial-
and-error with technical 
change 
None Light-weight, active-grip seats with 
fold-away features 
0% Far, increasing: local mgmt 
accept risk of steep learning 
curves 
Narrow-woven tapes 
for seat seams/ 
Domestic 
2nd-tier. Strictly follow-
design for world market 
and OEM supply for 
domestic market 
 
1 narrow weaver, 2 engineers/ 
learning-by-doing 
None Embodied in advanced production 
technology with more quality and 
control features 
0% Medium, stable: local mgmt 
handle a mature product with 
little technical change 
Valve guides and seats/ 
Domestic 
1st-tier. Primarily 
aftermarket, some follow-
design for world market 
 
1 engineer/ 
learning-by-doing: competence 
through experience 
JV with preferred 
OEM input 
supplier 
New composite materials with 
superior wear resistance, emissions, 
and weight characteristics 
0% Medium, stable: local mgmt 
aim at increasing volumes 
supplied to OEMs 
Specialized steel/ 
MNC subsidiary 
Service centre: (minor) 
customization of steel 
sourced from parent for 
toolmaker customers 
 
1 toolmaker/ 
learning-by-doing 
Training through 
parent company 
New steel qualities to build tools that 
accommodate lighter materials (e.g. 
plastics) in cars 
0% Far, increasing: local mgmt 
succeeded in upgrading the site 
from warehouse to service 
centre 
Press tool parts, chassis 
brackets/ 
Domestic 
1st-tier. Mostly OEM supply 
for domestic market and 
own design for  aftermarket 
accessories 
 
1 engineer/ 
some purposeful search for 
component design and 
prototyping 
Co-development of 
fuel tank with 
customer 
Laser technology instead of 
conventional press tooling 
0% Medium, stable: local mgmt 
tries to push design competence 
in context of mature product 
with slow technical change 
Electroplating/ 
Domestic 
2nd tier, primarily follow-
design for world markets 
2 electroplaters/ 
learning-by-doing and 
scanning of technical advances 
in field 
Joint purchase of 
fully automated 
plant with biggest 
competitor 
Vapour deposition coatings, “green” 
electrolyte technology, kinetic energy 
metallization 
0% Medium, stable: local mgmt 
keeps up with slow rate of 
change in industry 
 
Note: For information on technology frontier, see Appendix Table 1. 
Source: Case firms 
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Table 4. – Absorptive capacities of case firms: non-followers 
 
 Product/ 
ownership 
Firm mandate Most advanced technical 
skills/ 
type of learning 
Technical agreements Knowledge characteristics at 
technology frontier 
R&D 
spending/ 
turnover 
Proximity to technology 
frontier 
      
       
 
Interior parts and 
accessories/ 
MNC subsidiary (formerly 
domestically owned) 
1st-tier. Strictly follow-
design for world 
market and OEM 
supply for domestic 
market 
 
3 engineers/ 
only learning-by-doing: 
own toolshop 
discontinued 
Tools from parent 
company, but no intra-
group technology 
transfer 
New materials, new moulding 
techniques, sophisticated systems 
architecture developed in advanced 
simulation programmes 
0% Far, decreasing: local mgmt do 
not comprehensively 
understand technology behind 
their product portfolio, 
deskilling 
Lead-acid batteries/ 
Domestic 
Exclusively 
aftermarket 
1 engineer/ 
learning-by-doing: 
competence through 
flexible service 
 
None More powerful (42V), longer-lasting 
and fault-secure, intelligent power-
management systems 
0% Far, decreasing: local mgmt 
have no remit to graduate to 
intermediate-generation battery 
technology 
Parts from industrial 
rubbers/ 
Foreign 
1st- and 2nd-tier. 
Follow-design for 
world market, and 
OEM supply for 
domestic market,  
aftermarket 
 
1 engineer/ 
only learning-by-doing: 
no systematic knowledge 
mgmt 
License for tyre 
retreads 
New rubber compounds with superior 
heat, vulcanizate, and aging 
properties 
0% Far, decreasing: local mgmt do 
not understand technology 
inside their products 
Metal stamping/ 
Domestic 
2nd- and 1st-tier. 
Primarily follow-
design for world 
market and OEM 
supply for domestic 
market 
2 engineers/ 
learning-by-doing 
None New forming techniques, new 
composite materials, new hybrid 
technologies 
0% Medium, decreasing: local 
mgmt has only follower agenda 
in context of depreciating 
equipment 
 
Note: For information on technology frontier, see Appendix Table 1. 
Source: Case firms 
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8 Appendix 
 
Notes for a semi-structured interview with select car component manufacturers in South Africa, 2003 
 
Premise 
 
The purpose of these exploratory conversations is to probe the conditions for innovation activity in the automotive 
supply sector in South Africa. More specifically, the inquiry focuses on the relative dearth of product innovation since 
the opening of the sector to global competition and the arrival of foreign OEMs. Conceptually, we look at three 
different levels of analysis, namely the 
• individual firm and its (dynamic) capabilities (including intra- and inter-firm relations) 
• structure of global automotive supply chains 
• national innovation system. 
 
 
Section 1: The firm level 
 
1.1 Do you aim at product innovation? (If “no”, why not?) 
 
1.2 If “yes”, what do you target? 
 
1.3 What type of resources do you commit to your innovation activity in terms of … ? 
a) capital investment/equipment: (specific R&D outlays) 
b) skills (operating and managerial know-how): (Is learning a by-product from doing or a purposeful 
search?) 
c) product and input specifications (How do you generate and manage technical change?) 
d) organisational systems (How do you combine activities of R&D labs, design offices, production 
engineering etc.?) 
 
1.4 Do you believe that your involvement in quality control and production organisation has allowed (or will 
allow) you to generate activities in R&D, design, and production engineering (i.e. is there a progression from 
process to product innovation)? 
 
Section 2: The supply chain level 
 
2.1 In general, do you feel that local design and development activity is increasing or decreasing? 
 
2.2 In general, what is the more important impediment to acquiring global supply mandates…? 
a) your technological capability per se 
b) the financial, managerial and organisational resources required to develop global operations 
c) control by OEMs and/or parent company and/or JV partner and/or licensor and/or technical aid partner 
 
Section 3: The national innovation system 
 
3.1 Do technological opportunities on the domestic market differ from the demands of the global market? 
 
3.2 Are technical and graduate engineering skills readily available to you? (If “no”, what are the key weaknesses?) 
 
3.3 Do you feel that your scientists and/or engineers possess the problem-solving skills and the familiarity with 
research methodologies and instrumentation (and are they perhaps members in international networks of 
professional peers) to put your skill profile/technological capability at par with your global competitors? (If 
“no”, probe for reasons.) 
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Table 1. – The Global Technology Frontier in Product Portfolio of Case Firms 
 
Product/ 
component/ 
part 
Technology frontier Principal customers/ 
competitors (examples) 
   
Interior systems Process innovation 
 
(i) “Intertronics”: integration of electronics and interiors in common architecture of interchangeable (“pluggable”) modular 
components to save costs, shorten lead times, and broaden consumer choice 
 
(ii) acoustical testing systems and laboratories to improve acoustic performance while reducing weight, lowering cost, and 
improving recyclability 
 
(iii) “Ultra Light Technology”: non high-tech, sound-absorbing multi-layer material 
 
(iv) combination of acetal copolymer and thermoplastic elastomer (TPE) to allow overmoulding of soft surfaces onto acetal 
 
(v) MuCell technology: evenly distributed and uniformly sized microscopic cells with lower weight, higher dimensional 
stability, cheaper inputs, and reduced cycle time 
 
 
 
(i) Lear (US) 
 
 
(ii) Collins&Aikman (US), Johnson Controls (US), Lear 
(US), Magna Corp. (US) and others 
 
(iii) Rieter (D) 
 
(iv) Ticona (CAN), Kraiburg TPE (CAN) 
 
(v) Johnson Controls (US), Magna (CAN), INOAC (J), 
Takagi Seiko (J), MIG Plastics (US) (license from 
Trexel US)) 
 
a. Instrument panel 
and console 
Process innovation 
 
(i) combining blow and injection moulding in single part manufacturing; use of cast-composite ceramic-like production tooling 
to reduce tool development time and costs 
 
(ii) nylon 6 interspersed with layers of montmorillonite (nanocomposite): to reduce weight and improve mechanical properties 
 
Product innovation 
 
(iii) voice activation: temperature control, radio, on-board computer, wipers etc. 
 
 
(i) Lear (US) 
 
 
(ii) Toyota (J) + Ube Industries (J) 
 
 
 
(iii) Delphi Harrison Thermal Systems (US) 
 
b. HVAC Process innovation 
 
(i) parallel flow technology to enhance efficiency of heat exchanger 
 
(ii) use of CO2 to replace traditional greenhouse gas refrigerants 
 
(iii) brazed aluminium coil technology to enhance thermal efficiency 
 
(iv) no-frost evaporator to reduce energy consumption 
 
(v) use of computational fluid dynamics software to reduce system design lead time and improve system performance 
 
(vi) Energy Efficient Thermal System (EETS): reduces amount of power required for climate management 
 
Product innovation 
 
(vii) “Intellek” air quality sensor to block foul air from entering passenger compartment 
 
 
 
 
(i) Modine Manufacturing (US) 
 
(ii) Denso (J), Modine (US) 
 
(iii) Thermal Components (US) 
 
(iv) Bundy (UK) 
 
(v) Visteon (US) 
 
(vi) Visteon (US) 
 
 
 
(vii) Delphi (US) 
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(viii) ACX-10 Air Conditioning Life Extender protecting A/C components against premature failure by monitoring refrigerant 
pressure and voltage 
 
(ix) S8369 wide-angle photo sensor measuring IR-induced sun load as part of climate control and HVAC system 
 
(x) thermal imaging technology: cooling system with differential temperatures along the passenger’s body 
 
(viii) Index Sensors and Controls (US) 
 
 
(ix) Hamamatsu (J) 
 
(x) Delphi Harrison Thermal Systems (US) 
c. Seating Process innovation 
 
(i) Lightweight seat from ultra-high-strength steel and aluminium components 
 
(ii) DuPont’s high-strength, flexible fabrics stretched over a tubular metal frame to achieve an ergonomically correct but 
comfortable seat while saving on foam and springs 
 
Product innovation 
 
(iii) seats with posture improvement properties and active seats that grip passenger body in hard cornering 
 
(iv) “Open Seating”: high comfort, completely fold-away seat optimising cargo room 
 
 
(i) Magna International (CAN) 
 
(ii) Quantum Group (US) 
 
 
 
 
(iii) various tier-1 suppliers 
 
(iv) Johnson Controls (US) 
 
c.1 Leather seat 
covers 
Process innovation 
 
(i) “mold-in-place”: eliminates need for seat trim cover sewing by pouring seat foam directly into fabric; 
 
(ii) cover substitution: elastomeric layer over moulded foam (“upholstery skin”) in single-step technology 
 
Product innovation 
 
(iii) leather-like polymer product with better feel and superior water absorption characteristics 
 
(iv) microfibre suede materials to emulate grain leather or suede 
 
 
(i) Magna International (CAN) 
 
(ii) Dow Chemicals (US) 
 
 
 
(iii) Canadian General Tower (CAN) (licence from 
Idemitsu Technofine (J)) 
(iv) Clarino Division of Kuraray (US) 
 
c.2 Tapes for seat 
seams 
Process innovation 
 
(i) advanced production technology to allow e.g. for much wider patterning possibilities, photo-optical inspection etc. 
 
 
 
(i) Jakob Müller (CH) 
d. Door panels and 
trim 
Process innovation 
 
(i) larger blow-moulded pieces to consolidate functionality for doors; 
expanding low-pressure injection moulding to extend feasible types of fabrics 
 
(ii) “CrafTec partial mold-behind (PMB) and partial foam-in-place (PRP)”: reduces multiple fabricating and assembly steps to a 
single operation by integrating cover materials with panels themselves 
 
 
(iii) polyolefin-based trim covers instead of PVC to obtain higher durability, better low-temperature performance etc 
 
 
 
 
(i) Lear (US) 
 
 
(ii) Johnson Controls (US) 
 
 
 
(iii) Haartz Corp. (US), PolyOne (US) 
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(iv) new yarns, new finishing capabilities and new weaving and knitting technologies ? fabrics to contribute more to comfort 
(heating and cooling), be more durable and resistant to moisture, stains and odour retention. 
 
Product innovation 
 
(v) “phase change materials (PCM)”: using changes of physical states of PCMs integrated in textiles and storing and releasing 
heat as programmed to aid in air conditioning 
(iv) major automotive textile companies 
 
 
 
 
(v) Technical Testing & Innovation (??) 
 
 
e. Door locks Process innovation 
 
(i) “Local Interconnect Network (LIN)”: low-speed and low-cost bus communication subarchitecture controlling door locks, 
windows, and mirrors 
 
Product innovation 
 
(ii) “CAReader”: telematic, web-based system aimed at remote fleet management and control, including unlock doors etc. 
 
 
 
(i) Philips Semiconductors (US) and many others 
 
 
 
 
(ii) Networkcar (US) 
f. Alarm systems Product innovation 
 
(i) air-pressure sensing steering-wheel lock with wireless signal-transmission capability 
 
(ii) internet-based tracking and immobilization system accessible through WAP mobile phone 
 
(iii) “Datadot” system: 10,000 microdots containing vehicle identification number sprayed on cars 
 
 
 
(i) Super Sun Precision Industry (Taiwan) 
 
(ii) miTrek (AUS) 
 
(iii) Microdata Technology (AUS) 
Lighting Process innovation 
 
(i) “Fast Forward” simulation software to validate optical performance of designs with 98% accuracy obviating the need for 
early prototypes 
 
(ii) bullet-type LED with a double reflector to double output from same amount of power using microlens array technology 
 
(iii) interior lighting: lightpipes and fibre optics in optics; halogen, electroluminescence and cold-cathode fluorescent (CCFT) 
for niche applications 
 
Product innovation 
 
(iv) “adaptive front lighting systems” based on high-intensity discharge lighting (HID) and free-form cylinders, using shutters 
and lamp combinations to optimise light direction and volume 
 
(v) soft front ends to reduce impact in accidents 
 
 
(i) Guide Corp. (US) 
 
 
(ii) Omron (US) 
 
(iii) various 
 
 
 
 
(iv) Hella (D) 
 
 
(v) Hella (D) 
 
Engine parts, components, peripherals 
a. Valve guides and 
seats 
Process innovation 
 
(i) low-cost technology to produce silicon nitride ceramics with superior wear resistance properties compared to metal 
 
 
 
 
(i) Eaton Corp. (US) 
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(ii) Vespel SP 262: polymide to replace metals in valve guides requiring less lubrification, with reduced oil loss and lowered 
diesel engine emissions 
 
(iii) thermoplastic composite valve cover: achieves 65% weight reduction compared to metal at lower cost and environmental 
impact 
 
(ii) DuPont (CH) 
 
 
(iii) Bruss Sealing Systems (D) 
c. Batteries Process innovation 
 
(i) gas recombination: higher volumetric energy densities with enhanced cycle life 
 
Product innovation 
 
(ii) Select Orbital: sealed, modular, high-voltage battery system that can be located anywhere and in any orientation in the 
vehicle 
 
(iii) “Intelligent Power Management Systems”, including charge system failure and battery disconnect alarms, based on 
MOSFET semiconductors 
 
(iv) more powerful and reliable batteries for hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs): valve-regulated lead acid, nickel metal hydride, 
and lithium ion batteries plus ultra-(i.e. double-layer electrochemical) capacitator 
 
 
 
(i) various 
 
 
 
(ii) Exide (US) 
 
 
(iii) Intra Technologies (US) 
 
 
(iv) various 
 
 
Fuel tanks Process innovation 
 
(i) “blow forming”: processing technology allowing to insert components inside the tank 
 
(ii) integrated plastic air intake and fuel system with a fuel rail moulded into the air intake manifold, to reduce cost and 
weight and increase quality 
 
Product innovation 
 
(iii) Coex CVR (complete vapour recovery) cover for plastic fuel tanks, meeting CARB (California Air Resources Board) 
emission requirements 
 
 
(iv) “Ship in a Bottle” (SIB): components are moved inside the tank to reduce the number of shell openings 
 
 
 
(i) ABC Group (US) 
 
(ii) various thermoplastic operators 
 
 
 
 
(iii) Krupp Kautex Maschinenbau (D) 
 
 
 
(iv) TI Group (US) + AMTECC (CAN) + Atofina (F) 
 
Catalytic converters, 
exhaust systems 
Process innovation 
 
(i) “Lightweight Exhaust System”: components independently attached to vehicle structure rather than being hung in one heavy 
piece, using stainless steel tubing anchored to floorpan; combination of acoustic and thermal insulation 
 
(ii) “artificial muscles”: films of electroactive silicone or acrylic polymers that flatten or stretch with an electric current at 
fraction of weight of conventional dampeners 
 
(iii) “digital simulation of exhaust systems”: allows for calculation of dynamics of systems in use 
 
 
 
 
 
(i) Bosal (US), (ArvinMeritor (US), Tenneco 
Automotive (US), Faurecia (F), Eberspacher (D)) 
 
(ii) SRI (US) 
 
 
(iii) Exa Corp.’s PowerFLOW software (US) 
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Product innovation 
 
(iv) “exhaust oxygen sensor”: determines stoichiometric air-to-fuel ratio point to optimise air and fuel management and 
minimise tailpipe emissions 
 
 
(v) “zeolite-Y-based catalyst material for plasma-catalysis exhaust treatment”: allows for removal of 90% of NO without 
requiring major design changes to vehicles or fueling infrastructure 
 
(vi) new catalytic converter substrate (Aluchrome 7A1 YHf) to speed up reaching of ideal operating temperature and thus 
reduce pollution emission 
 
 
(vii) “DPNR”: catalytic converter for diesel engines that simultaneously reduces oxides of nitrogen and particulates through a 
multi-function catalyst overlaying a porous ceramic filter 
 
(viii) plasma-based regenerative filters: reduce particulates of diesel emissions by 94-9% 
 
 
 
(ix) “air-to-air package”: integration of fresh-air induction, emission control, and exhaust systems 
 
 
(iv) Delphi (US) 
 
 
 
(v) Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (US), with 
Delphi (US) and Ford (US) 
 
(vi) Krupp VDM (D) + Fraunhofer Institute for Applied 
Materials Research (D) + University of Wuppertal (D) 
+ Emitec (D) 
 
(vii) Toyota (J) 
 
 
(viii) Faurecia (F), NoxTech (US), DaimlerChrysler 
(D), GM (US, Ford (US, Delphi (US) + Peugeot Citroën 
(F) 
 
(ix) ArvinMeritor (US) + Zeuna Starker (D) 
 
Tyres Process innovation 
 
(i) “C3M”: process technology that allows to build tread layer from several strips of compound with different, individually 
optimised properties 
 
(ii) custom-designed fixed-mount sensors to fit on rim directly and reduce manufacturing costs 
 
Product innovation 
 
(iii) “intelligent tyres”: application of silicon sensors, RF transmitters, and other sensing techniques to allow tyres to monitor 
pressure, track temperatures, know loading conditions, command onboard pumps to add air 
 
 
 
 
(iv) “TIPM” (Tire Intelligent Pressure Management): 380W air compressor mounted in trunk or engine bay to repressurise tyre 
by 25l air/minute 
 
(v) “SWT” (Sidewall Torsion Sensor): magnetised sensors on tyre sidewall feed road, braking, and speed data to sensor mounted 
on axle assembly allowing faster reaction than current ESP technology 
 
(vi) runflat tyres: elimination of spare wheel 
 
 
(i) Michelin (F) 
 
 
(ii) SmarTire 
 
 
 
(iii) BERU (D), Bosch (D), Cycloid (US), Goodyear 
(US), Infineon (D), Lear (US), Michelin (F), Motorola 
(US), Schrader Electronics (UK), SensoNor (N), SFK 
(S), TRW (US), Wabco Vehicle Control Systems (US) 
 
 
(iv) Michelin (F), Wabco (US) 
 
 
(v) Continental (D) 
 
 
(vi) Bridgestone (J), Goodyear (US), Michelin (F) 
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Industrial rubbers Product innovation 
 
(i) Therban ®: new formulation with higher heat resistance over time to accommodate increased under-the-hood operating 
temperatures 
 
(ii) Vulcuren ®anti-reversion agent: bifunctional crosslinker improving thermal stability of crosslinks, aging behaviour, and 
static and dynamic vulcanizate properties 
 
 
 
(i) Bayer (D) 
 
 
(ii) Bayer (D) 
Body structure and parts 
a. Specialised steel Product innovation 
 
(i) “Stavax Supreme”: premium grade stainless tool steel with greater corrosion resistance, to accommodate more ambitious use 
of plastics in cars 
 
 
 
(i) Böhler Uddeholm (A) 
 
b. Die castings Process innovation 
 
(i) “MIM”: magnesium-injection moulding process offering strong, lightweight components with superior properties than die-
cast magnesium 
 
(ii) Charge-Air-Cooler high temperature nylon end tanks: lower weight and cost and better performance than die cast 
aluminium 
 
(iii) rapid prototyping (RP) and rapid tooling (RT): direct conversion of 3D CAD data into physical prototype and 
manufacturing, reducing lead time and cost of industrial tooling 
 
(iv) High-Q-casting: vacuum die casting technique producing thin-walled castings with high ductility (e.g. used for B-Pillar in 
all-alu Audi A2 chassis 
 
(v) Ryobi New Casting process: using finite-element analysis to boost strength-to-weight-ratio of castings; imcreases injection 
pressure, heats die halves, and introduces vaccum pumps to remove air bubbles for an improved quality 
 
 
 
(i) Phillips Plastics Corp. (US) 
 
 
(ii) Ford (US) + Valeo (F) + Carlisle Engineered 
Products (US) 
 
(iii) various 
 
 
(iv) Alcan (US) 
 
 
(v) Ryobi (J) 
c. Metal stamping Process innovation 
 
(i) “Electromagnetically assisted stamping (EMAS)”: applying electromagnetism to avoid for aluminium edges to tear or wrinkle 
during forming operations 
 
(ii) process optimization – instead of sheet material improvement – to manufacture stronger and lighter automotive panels in 
more complex shapes 
 
(iii) carbon-fiber composites (instead of metal) in auto chassis structures using a production-capable process (compression-
moulded SMC): reduces parts weight 
 
(iv) plastic/metal hybrid technologies where plastic joins steel in a true structural member and in the injection moulding pocess 
 
 
(i) Ohio State University (US) 
 
 
(ii) PNGV (Partnership for a New Generation of 
Vehicles) (US) 
 
(iii) Meridian Automotive Systems (US) for 
DaimlerChrysler (D) 
 
(iv) Audi (D) + Faurecia (F) 
d. Press tool parts Process innovation 
 
(i) “parts without machining”: replacement of cutting tools or presses for manufacture of metal parts in favour of laser 
technology that allows going straight from a CAD model to a full-blown 3D part (? free-form fabrication through Laser 
Engineered Net Shaping) 
 
 
(i) Sandia National Laboratories (US) 
 
 
 27
Product/ 
component/ 
part 
Technology frontier Principal customers/ 
competitors (examples) 
   
(ii) “fineblanking”: material to be formed reliably held in place in the tooling to achieve much closer clearance between the 
elements than with conventional press tooling 
 
(ii) both suppliers and OEMs with the requisite 
craftsmanship 
e. Electro-plating  Process innovation 
 
(i) vapour deposition coatings: allows deposition of metals and refractory compounds difficult to apply by other means, leading 
to functional and aesthetic finishes for interior parts, without environmental limitations or hydrogen embrittlement associated 
with platings 
 
(ii) research into “green” electrolyte technology using far less toxic ionic Chromium III salts instead of conventional 
Chromium IV 
 
 
(iii) kinetic energy metallization: metal powders are high-velocity sprayed on substrate surface to establish an interfacial bond 
leading to a flat and well-adhered coating while eliminating caustic or poisonous chemicals often involved in electroplating 
 
 
 
(i) Vapor Technologies (US) 
 
 
 
(ii) Poeton Industries, Smiths Aerospace, Whyte 
Chemicals, University of Leicester (all UK), funded by 
UK government 
 
(iii) Inovati (US) 
f. Fastening systems Process innovation 
 
(i) linear-motor drive with higher precision than electromagnetic devices to weld nohole systems 
 
(ii) dynamic simulation of loading and strain rates reflecting actual operating conditions of structures or components 
 
(iii) use of self-piercing rivets with higher dynamic strengths than obtained in conventional spot welding 
 
Product innovation 
 
(iv) adhesives capable of bonding to less adhesive-friendly surfaces; lower weight, and recyclable 
 
 
 
(i) Emhart Fastening Teknologies (US) 
 
(ii) Instron Corp. (US) 
 
(iii) Textron Fastening Systems (US) 
 
 
 
(iv) 3M (US) 
 
Painted plastic parts Process innovation 
 
(i) “SLX film”: eliminates the need for double painting with colour-contrast vehicles 
 
(ii) dry paint film laminate: allows for high- or low-gloss finishes at lower cost than spray painting and eliminates related 
environmental volatile organic compounds disposal issues 
 
(iii) formable “dry-paint films”: plastic films coated with stretchable paint layers that retain integrity when films are 
thermoformed; cost reduction, better resistance and recyclability 
 
(iv) “moulded-in-colour” film: even cheaper than dry-paint films 
 
 
(v) nanocomposite thermoplastic olefin: uses microscopic clay particle reinforcement to increase stiffness and improve 
ductility 
 
 
 
(i) GE Plastics (US) 
 
(ii) Avery Dennison (US) 
 
 
(iii) Soliant HHC (US) 
 
 
(iv) Mayco Plastics (US) + DaimlerChrysler (D) 
 
 
(v) GM (US) + Basell Polyolefins (US) 
 
 
Source: 
Adhesives Age, Advanced Materials & Composites News, Aftermarket Business, Aluminium International, Appliance Manufacturer, Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, AsiaPuls News, Assembly Automation, 
Automotive Industries, Auto Interiors, Automotive Design & Production, Automotive Manufacturing & Production, Automotive News, Automotive Plastics, Batteries International, Bobbin, Business First of 
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Buffalo, Canadian Plastics, Ceramic Industry, Chemical Market Reporter, Chemical Week, Construction Equipment, CRN, Design News, EBN, EDN, Electronic Business, The Engineer, European Rubber 
Journal, Fleet Equipment, Fleet Owner, Fortune, Foundry Management & Technology, Industry Week, Journal of Manufacturing Processes, Machine Design, Manufacturing Engineering, Market News 
Publishing, Mechanical Engineering, Modern Plastics, Molding Systems, Plastics Technology, Plastics World, PR Newswire, Printed Circuit Design, Professional Engineering, Quality, Research & 
Development, Rubber World, Sensor Review, Taiwan Economic News, Technology Review, Textile World, Wall Street Journal, Ward’s Auto World 
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